Archive: October 2013

1
No Sanctions for Spoliation of Emails in Former Officers’ Personal Accounts Absent Evidence of Bad Faith or Prejudice
2
Court Concludes that “at least in the Seventh Circuit,” the Duty to Preserve is Triggered “when a litigant knew or should have known that litigation was imminent” as Opposed to “Reasonably Foreseeable”
3
Da Silva Moore: Plaintiffs’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari on Question of Recusal Denied

No Sanctions for Spoliation of Emails in Former Officers’ Personal Accounts Absent Evidence of Bad Faith or Prejudice

Puerto Rico Tel. Co., Inc. v. San Juan Cable, LLC, No. 11-2135 (GAG/BJM), 2013 WL 5533711 (D.P.R. Oct. 7, 2013)

Plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to preserve relevant emails from the personal accounts of three former officers (the CEO, General Manager, and Senior Vice President) and sought an adverse inference instruction.  While the court agreed that Defendant’s failure to locate certain emails was a breach of the duty to preserve and constituted spoliation, no sanctions were imposed absent evidence of bad faith or a demonstration of prejudice.

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Court Concludes that “at least in the Seventh Circuit,” the Duty to Preserve is Triggered “when a litigant knew or should have known that litigation was imminent” as Opposed to “Reasonably Foreseeable”

In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2385, 2013 WL 5377164 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2013)

In this case, the court found that the duty to preserve arose after the at-issue information was destroyed in accordance with Defendant’s document retention policies and that an adverse inference was not warranted.  Considering the proper standard to employ when assessing when the duty to preserve is triggered, the court concluded that “the duty to preserve is triggered only when a litigant knew or should have known that litigation was imminent (at least in the Seventh Circuit).”

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Da Silva Moore: Plaintiffs’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari on Question of Recusal Denied

On October 7, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States denied Plaintiffs’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari arising from Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck’s refusal to recuse himself in this case.  As was previously reported on this blog, Plaintiffs sought an answer to the question: “Should a court of appeals review a judge’s denial of a motion to recuse de novo or for an abuse of discretion?”  Readers may recall that the plaintiffs in this case sought the recusal of Magistrate Judge Peck following his approval of Defendant’s predictive coding protocol.  That motion was denied by Magistrate Judge Peck.  Plaintiffs then took the issue before the District Court, which likewise declined to compel recusal, and then to the Second Circuit, which denied Plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of mandamus.  Plaintiffs then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which, as discussed, was denied.

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