Catagory:Case Summaries

Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., —F.R.D.—, 2015 WL 872294 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015)

Taking up the topic of technology-assisted review (“TAR”), Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck’s most recent opinion declares that “it is now black letter law that where the producing party wants to utilize TAR for document review, courts will permit it.” Despite this, there remain open issues surrounding the use of TAR, including, as Magistrate Judge Peck noted, the question of “how transparent and cooperative the parties need to be with respect to the seed or training set(s).” And, while this opinion did not resolve that question (because the parties in the present case agreed to “a protocol that discloses all non-privileged documents in the control sets”), it does provide some notable commentary on the issue

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Comprehensive Addiction Treatment Center, Inc. v. Leslea, No. 11-cv-03417-CMA-MJW, 2015 WL 638198 (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2015)

Plaintiffs brought a “Motion to Review Clerk’s Taxing of Costs Under F.R.C.P. 54(D)(1).” Specifically, Plaintiffs sought review of the clerk’s determination “concerning the costs taxed amount of $55,649.98, which accounts for Defendants contracting with a private consulting company, Cyopsis, to retrieve and convert ESI into a retrievable format to produce information requested by Plaintiffs.” The court held that “[b]ecause Defendants’ costs related to the electronically stored information (“ESI”) are expenses enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4), and Plaintiffs were aware that Defendants would have to retain an outside consultant to retrieve and convert the ESI into a retrievable format, Plaintiffs’ Motion is denied.”

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United Corp. v. Tutu Park Ltd., No. ST-2001-CV-361, 2015 WL 457853 (V.I. Jan. 28, 2015)

In December 2012, the court in this case issued a subpoena directing Kmart Corporation (“Kmart”) to produce twenty-one categories of documents and later granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel the same.  Accordingly, Kmart produced responsive documentation, but not to Plaintiff’s satisfaction.  Plaintiff thereafter moved for sanctions and for Kmart to be held in contempt.  Concluding that Kmart made a reasonable attempt to provide responsive documentation, and acknowledging Kmart’s explanations for their inability to provide more, including the destruction of documents pursuant to their document retention policy and changes in technology, the court declined to impose sanctions or to hold Kmart in contempt.

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Federico v. Lincoln Military Housing, LLC, No. 2:12-cv-80, 2014 WL 7447937 (E.D. Va. Dec. 31, 2014)

In this class action case involving consolidated claims for personal injury and property damage, Plaintiffs’ production of social media posts and other electronically stored information was significantly delayed and allegedly incomplete.  The court declined to dismiss Plaintiffs’ case, however, where “a nearly complete record” was eventually produced, where the information was of “limited relevance” and where there was no showing of Plaintiffs’ bad faith.  Instead, the court declined to allocate the $29,000 Plaintiffs spent for expert assistance and indicated it would award a portion of Defendants’ attorneys’ fees.  For Plaintiffs’ failure to produce text messages, the court invoked Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) and declined to impose any sanctions.

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Lord Abbett Mun. Income Fund., Inc v. Asami, No. C-12-03694 DMR, 2014 WL 5477639 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014)

Following an order granting summary judgment in their favor, the “Board Member Defendants” notified the plaintiff that they would no longer contribute to the cost of storing 159 computers, but refused to consent to allowing Plaintiff to dispose of them, arguing that Plaintiff should be required to preserve the computers until “after the Ninth Circuit has ruled on its appeal and any trial has been completed.”  The court declined to compel Plaintiff to bear the costs and burden of continuing to preserve, however, where discovery had closed, where there was no indication that the computers contained relevant information, and where the defendants had “numerous opportunities to test their belief that the computers may have evidentiary value, but [had] refused to act on them.”

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Armstrong Pump, Inc. v. Hartman, No. 10-CV-446S, 2014 WL 6908867 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2014)

In this breach of contract case, the court granted in part Defendant’s motion to compel and, in light of Plaintiff’s piecemeal production (which the court had earlier cautioned against) and other discovery failures, fashioned a “new and simpler approach” to discovery, including the identification of 13 search terms/phrases to be utilized when searching “ALL [of Plaintiff’s] corporate documents, files, communications, and recordings. . .”  The court also ordered the plaintiff and all counsel of record to file a sworn statement confirming its “good-faith effort to identify sources of documents; that a complete search of those sources for each of the [identified] phrases occurred; and that the search results [were] furnished to [Defendant].”

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Pero v. Norfolk S. Ry., Co., No. 3:14-CV-16-PLR-CCS, 2014 WL 6772619 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 1, 2014)

In this case, the court declined to require the plaintiff to view the at-issue video at Defendant’s counsel’s office or to obtain a license for the proprietary viewing software and ordered the defendant to either produce a laptop with the video loaded on it for Plaintiff’s use in the litigation or to reimburse the plaintiff for the cost of a software license.

Plaintiff, a train conductor who was allegedly injured while attempting to remove a tree that was blocking the railroad tracks, sought to compel Defendant’s production of relevant video.  Defendant stated that it “merely own[ed] a license to use the software” necessary to view the video and that providing a copy to Plaintiff would exceed the license’s scope. Instead, Defendant offered to allow Plaintiff’s counsel to view the video at Defendant’s counsel’s office or suggested that Plaintiff pay $500 to obtain his own software license.  Plaintiff moved to compel the production of a copy of the video; Defendant moved for a protective order.

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